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INTRODUCTION
Pensions programs are one of the various branches of social security systems. Social
insurance is built over the principles of solidarity, equity, unity and universality, which
are supreme fundamentals of the human race. How could we define them?
Many concepts and synonyms can be obsolete to answer this question. Philosophers,
sociologists and anthropologists have deliberated about a possible answer to this
question; therefore, it is a complicated task.  However, the issue here is how
policymakers can achieve such a goal.
No one knows the magic formula; neither he/she has the ultimate criteria. So the critical
point is not to give an answer to the question, but to search for the methods that will help
to find in which direction to go. The chore of encountering a way Korea should go within
the near future.
My intent then is to set some of the main considerations of a problematic system, looking
forward to contribute for a change in Korean policies. The objective of this thesis is to
depict the problem of the aging populations in the Republic of Korea, the diverse
mechanisms of pension programs as well as positive aspects of implementing new
systems. It tries to examine the Korean case and suggest some potential answers to
overcome a progressive crisis.
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The inadequate pension systems around the world and the rapid increase of the aging
population threaten not only the elderly but their children and grandchildren as well.  The
World Bank has named this problem as the “Old Age Crisis”. Future generations will
have to support the elderly directly or indirectly. Therefore, we shall consider seriously
the importance of the issue because it presents a great danger to the development of the
world economy, hampering growth in different ways.
As the world’s population ages, old age social security systems are in trouble worldwide.
Due to the rapid demographic transitions caused by rising life expectancy and declining
fertility, it is understandable the elderly population in the world is growing rapidly. “Life
expectancy in the developing HPAE’s increased from 56 years in 1960 to 71 years in
1990. (In other low-and middle-income economies, life expectancy also rose considerably,
from 36 and 49 to 62 and 66 years, respectively.)”1   
In some parts of Asia and Africa, the elderly constitute a small part of the population.
Their families normally take care of them (mainly food and shelter) and other informal
kind of arrangements. Formal programs set specially by the government are considered to
be rudimentary.  The programs established in these developing countries are relatively
new and poor in the quality of the services they offer.  Even Latin America, which is
another region that has a large number of developing countries, has had social security
and pension systems for more than five decades.
                                                                
1 World Bank, The East Asian Miracle, (Washington D.C.: Oxford University Press, World Bank, 1993), p.
4.
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Nevertheless, some changes are required even though these are not easy to address. From
my point of view this is an extremely difficult task and more when it is related to adopt
some possible models for a policy reform. Transfer of economic models on diverse
grounds has demonstrated serious difficulties and inefficiencies. Therefore, policymakers
should be cautious in fulfilling the requirements of diligent analysis and a proper
evaluation of the context and realities of the country attempting to do it.
It is extremely important to understand the point that could seem discouraging while
trying to consider my proposal. It is that the present work does not focus its attention on
the reforming efforts or external advising attempts tried so far by different organizations.
On one hand, organizations try to provide a clear scope of the horizons after a change
including simulation models to target.  On the other hand, I try to give my contribution by
allowing the reader to perform alone and develop his/her own ideas about the possible
benefits of what should be a reformation attempt.
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter I consists in a general overview of the current
situation of the aging populations around the world, and also the consideration of some
important facts about retirement. Chapter II provides a background of the different
pension systems with some emphasis on a pay-as-you-go plan, degree of inefficiency and
related characteristics. Chapter III depicts the Korean situation, its initial scheme, current
problems, and some reformation efforts. Chapter IV determines the costs and benefits of
privatization issues from an economic point of view, and some social considerations too.
Chapter V discusses the introduction of a new plan, a formal proposal, and some of the
13
most important transitional issues. Finally, Chapter VI includes conclusions and
recommendations.
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CHAPTER I
OVERVIEW OF THE WORLD STATUS AND RETIREMENT
1.1. Some general facts 2
Many countries are trying to update, reform or change radically their pension schemes.
The problems have been felt by the economies that have seen liberalization of markets
and current advancements of technologies, as well as communication and transportation
trends.  So the adjustments in legal, structural, and other institutional changes are to
come; but for the time being some facts are to be considered also. Therefore, I have set
some relevant facts needed to better understand this thesis:
Figure 1.
Source: World Bank, 1994
                                                                
2 This section is derived from World Bank, Averting the Old Age Crisis: Policies to Protect the Old and
Promote Growth, The World Bank, 1994)
Percentage of Increase in World Population over 60 Years Old, by 2030
China 29%
Asia (less China) 29%
Transitional socialist economies and
developing countries 28%
OECD countries 14%
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·  In 1990 slightly more than 9 percent of the world’s population were sixty years old.
By 2030 the number is going to triple. Most of this growth will happen in developing
countries, but half of it in Asia, excluding China.
· The declining fertility and increasing medical improvements make developing
countries to age more rapidly than industrialized nations.
· The demand of health services increases as the country's population gets older.
Health care as well as pensions become a large burden for the governments’ budgets
because services are concentrated on the elderly.
· High government spending on old age security crowds out other important public
goods such as infrastructure and services. The amount of these expenditures as
percentage of GDP is huge, and they also account for more than 35 percent of the
government’s public spending in some European countries.
· Publicly managed funds often disappear by poor management.
· High payroll taxes distort labor markets and reduce growth. (This point can be itself
topic for big debates).
· Government pensions are not commonly indexed to inflation and workers find
themselves poorly protected when they are old.
· Workers retiring in early years after the pension program have been implemented
receive positive lifetime benefits, while after some years (three to four decades)
workers retiring will have a negative balance.
· The systems have demonstrated that they are not efficient in redistributing income
among the rich and the poor.  Normally rich people live longer than poor people and
receive higher pensions due to their contributions.
16
1.2. What is retirement?
As countries experience a higher level of industrialization, extended life expectancy is
seen. People in earlier centuries had much lower life expectancy than they do now.   Then,
people that for this study are workers mainly, reach some point in their lives at which
they have to withdraw from the labor force. Some people of working age are not working
due to either leisure or unemployment.
Retirement seems not difficult to assess, but it has lots of implications for the individual
and the society. In the one hand retirement in a wide sense is to drop out of the labor
force, to stop working. In the other hand, work however can be defined broadly: “ … in
terms of any activity contributing to a person’s standard of living then clearly this
continues throughout life and no one ever retires.”3  After you stop working, you are
supposed to receive a pension from the hands of the government (not considering private
plans), you become eligible for a future fixed stream of money. For example, what
happens with a housewife whose daily activity is still unchanged? Is she ever going to
retire?
Then retirement can be treated as a single issue, although some clarifications need to be
made to help the reader to identify its implications. Concerns about difficulties for
retiring have to be seen from different perspectives, from the individual and the social
perspective.  This point of view poses psychological stress on the future retiree who will
definitely have to face health and physical complications. From a social viewpoint this
17
group of people will absorb enormous amount of resources in the form of the provision of
welfare benefits in the short and long–run.
The non-monetary (psychic) costs and monetary costs (income and returns from savings
mainly) are to be considered in the decision to leave the work force. Implications prior
taking the economic decision of retirement, undoubtedly depends on the valuation and
preference that each individual puts for leisure on one hand and for security in the future
on the other. The model shown by Mallier and Shafto (1992) is very illustrative for this
purpose. It says that many pensioners return to work because the pension benefit they
receive is not enough to fulfill their level of satisfaction.  In other words their living
standard has fallen sharply, so that they cannot attain what they were used to. This poses
a threat on employment, because it distorts the market by reducing the entry of young
workers.  Some considerations are to be made.
a) Persons return to work when the level of satisfaction after retirement is lower than
before. The indifference curve lies in a lower line that could not provide the same
utility level. (See Figure 2)
b) Leisure is more valuable for some individuals than for others.
c) If you have some additional stream of earnings you will not go back to work or try to
find a new job.
d) “Unless retired people have very rare and marketable talent, they are unlikely able to
earn a wage higher that the one they received as members of the full-time
workforce.”4
                                                                                                                                                                                                
3 A. T. Mallier and T.A.C. Shafto, The Economics of Flexible Retirement, (London: Academic Press
Limited, 1992), p. 12.
4 A.T. Mallier and T.A.C. Shafto, op.cit, p. 42.
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Figure 2.
Retirement vs. income-leisure preference
              A2              
              A1
               A
INCOME      Y2                                                                  U2
                Y0                                                U3                            U1
                Y1
                  O
                                                   L0             L2
                                                                            LEISURE HOURS
* Retirement and the income-leisure preference ‘A’. The worker who retires on a full two- third
pension and who was on a level of utility U0 may enjoy increased satisfaction at utility U1 with
full retirement and no work. A wage rate above that required producing potential earnings A1Z
would maintain pre-retirement wage rates would be needed to entice the worker back to the
labour force. The ability to maintain pre-retirement wage rates would increase the utility to U2,
income to OY at leisure level OL2. (Miller and Shafto, 1992)
The figure and the explanation given by the authors are a clear-cut of why decisions are
being made in a rational and practical way.
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CHAPTER II
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF PENSION SYSTEMS
2.1. Different plans to finance old age security
Over time different alternatives of insurance for the elderly had been tried. There are
three, which are most common plans or basic schemes. They are public pay-as-you-go
programs, employer-sponsored plans, and personal saving and annuity plans.   
Publicly supported pension and early retirement plans exist in all industrialized
countries.5 “They were implemented to improve the well-being of the elderly and to open
job opportunities for younger workers.  They are also an important factor in the huge
reductions in elderly poverty rates and in the decreased labor participation of older men
found in most countries.”6
2.1.1. Public Pension systems
Pay-as-you-go plans (PAYG)
These programs have become by far the most common programs in industrialized
countries to support the elderly. Publicly managed pension schemes and pay-as-you-go
are usually financed by a payroll tax.  Under this system benefits received by current
retirees determine the amount of taxes workers have to pay. “A pay-as-you-go system is
said to be financially balanced when pension payments are exactly matched by workers
20
contributions.” 7 This intergenerational social contract of mandatory savings are between
workers and pensioners endorsed by implicit government debt or promise to contributing
worker cohorts that will benefit them from future worker contributions once they retire.
The replacement rate8 is around 50 percent in middle-income countries and 10 to 20
percent in lower-income countries (World Bank, 1994). In Korea it is 80 to 90 percent
(including pension benefit and severance pay), for a 40 year of participation. However,
there are many variations for these programs. These programs are structured depending
on either a means-tested or means-related program.
Pure pay-as-you-go systems rarely exist. It usually happen that most of these public
systems accumulate a current cash surplus in earlier years; but as the systems matures and
populations become older, the accumulated reserves get exhausted or even come to a
deficit. This situation has been seen in the Korean case, which is supposed to use up its
National Pension Fund reserves by the year of 2033 as projections made by Moon and
other experts at the Korean Development Institute (KDI).
It is said that only when the PAYG system is mature, population growth is constant, and
the system is financially balanced, pensioners are paid on average a real rate of return on
their contributions equal to the real rate of growth of the wage bill or the economy.
                                                                                                                                                                                                
5 This section is derived from Rebecca Blank, citing M. Rebik’s, 1994, “ Does Larger Social Safety Net
Men Less Economic Flexibility?,” chap. 5 in Working Under Different Rules, (New York: Russel Sage
Foundation, 1994), p.180.
6  Blank, Rebecca, “Does a Larger Social Safety Net Mean Less Economic Flexibility?,” Ibid.
7 Giancarlo Corsetti and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, “Pension reform and growth,” chap. 5 in The Economics of
Pensions, edited by Valdez-Prieto, Salvador, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 131-132.
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There are two reasons why the return on their contributions differs from real market
interest rate:
First, the growth rate of the wage bill is typically lower than the real rate of return on capital – a feature
of dynamically efficient economies a la Diamond (1965).  Second, although the growth rate of the
return obtained by each individual worker is different from the average pensioner’s return. The reason
is that pay-as-you-go pensions often include a component (unrelated contributions) that distributes
income within cohorts.  This distributional component favors (often only in theory) low-income
workers or (often in practice) powerful worker groups who are able to secure generous pensions from
the political establishment. Hence, a pay-as-you-go scheme is in general actuarially unfair from the
point of view of individual workers.  9
The problem with this plans is that policy-makers often find themselves in trouble when
they have to maintain the actuarial balance, either by: a) Reducing dependency ratio by
raising the minimum retirement age or tightening eligibility conditions. b) Reduce the
replacement ratio, by modifying the formula to calculate benefits, lengthening the
contributory period, applying sanctions to those who remain in the labor force, among
others.  All of this make it difficult to increase government revenues and budget
administrators have to meet their obligations with limited resources, not achievable by
increased taxation (that is said to be counterproductive). “System adjustment of this sort
have come to be called ‘parametric reforms’ because they shift the actuarial levers of the
system while leaving its structure the same”10
2.1.2.Private Systems
Occupational plans
As its name tells us, these are pensions privately managed by occupation generally
offered by employers to their employees. That is why they are also denominated
                                                                                                                                                                                                
8 Replacement rate = pension benefit / average lifetime income.
9 Giancarlo Corsett i and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, “Pension reform and growth,” op.cit. p. 130.
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“employer-sponsored plans”.   In the past, governments used to cover its military and
civilian employees using these kinds of systems. Nowadays, these have been adopted
increasingly by most of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
Countries (OECD).  More than 40 percent of workers are covered by this kind of system
in Germany, Japan, The Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United
States (World Bank, 1994). This is not new because not only pensions systems but also
health care systems were used in Latin America since 1960s. “Most employer plans,
other than those of the older agricultural states, have either come into being or been
rapidly enlarged in recent years, as have all but a handful of the community and
cooperative schemes now operating”.11
These programs have been the result of the ability of collective bargaining by labor
unions or simply as a mean from employers to retain or attract workers. Their coverage is
uneven and it varies between one employer and another. They are mainly invested in
equity, stocks or trust funds, but they carry the negative characteristic of not being
transportable.
Personal saving and annuity plans
Generally speaking, personal saving is mainly a way to overcome unexpected difficulties
in the future.  For this study saving shall be understood as the accumulation of assets by
the workers to support themselves when they are old.  The plan is to have enough savings
for the future, either on an individual basis or by depositing savings in annuity plans
                                                                                                                                                                                                
10 F. Landis Mackellar, and William P. McGreevey, The Growth and Containment of Social Security
Systems, Development Policy Review, vol. 17. 3 (1999): p. 22
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(your savings being, either publicly managed by the government or by private providers
such as private management fund companies). In this case the individual has to bear the
investment risk of its savings. Voluntary savings is found in almost every country, often
encouraged by tax or other kind of incentives placed by the governments, and in other
parts of the world such as Malaysia and Singapore this form of saving have been made
mandatory.
  
East Asian economies have a high private savings rate, a diverging pattern seen in other
developing countries such as the ones in the Latin American. As said before, there had
been incentives to save encouraged by the state, such as the case of “postal saving
system”, which worked very well in Korea and in other countries like Japan, Malaysia,
and Singapore.
Savings have contributed enormously to the economic development of many countries.
Some part of these savings have adopted the form of contributions to pension schemes,
managed privately by firms such as the Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFPs)
(pension fund administrator) in Chile. Other countries in South America like Colombia,
Argentina and Peru have emulated the model, after observing the remarkable success of it.
CHAPTER III
DEPICTING THE KOREAN PENSION SCHEME 12
                                                                                                                                                                                                
11 World Bank, Financing Health Services in Developing Countries (Washington D.C.: Oxford University
Press, World Bank, 1987), p. 34.
12 Big portion of this section is derived from the lecture given by Dr. Hyung-Pyo Moon at the School of
Public Policy and Global Management, KDI, August 2, 1999. The lecturer is a research fellow at the
Korean Development Institute being one of the leading scholars in the field of pensions, and had work in
various reformation committees.
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There are several arguments to explain the growth of social security systems in middle-
income economies and the faster growth in upper-middle-income economies qualified
like that by the World Bank (Korea is included in the last category). One argument from
the supply-side considered by the professors’ Mackellar and McGreevey presents a very
interesting point. This reasoning hypothesizes that PAYG systems are widespread
accepted because these give the illusion that benefits are proportional to workers’
contributions. When a country is poor, the state’s ability to engage in social security
expenditure is constrained because it has a limited ability to impose payroll taxes
(contributions) as well as other income taxes. However, when the economy grows and
goes through middle stages of development, then fiscal targets are more ambitious and
seem easier to accomplish. “Thus, countries pass through a stage during which social
security spending expands rapidly along the demand curve as the fiscal supply constraint
is loosened.”13 Korea shares some of the most common features of problematic public
pension systems. Its scheme has various characteristics in referral to its pension funds,
which will deplete its reserves in the near future.  Lets look briefly at the general
structure of it and determine some considerations that should be observed carefully.
The Republic of Korea has a partially funded system14 consisting of two big schemes. The
National Pension Scheme (NPS) and the Occupational Pension Schemes (OPS). As it
                                                                
13 Mackellar, F. Landis and William P. McGreevey, The Growth and Containment of Social Security
Systems, op.cit. p. 24
14 “Under defined-benefit pension schemes, beneficiaries receive a pension with reference not to how much
money they contributed, but to some other criterion, such as final salary. The most common way of
financing defined-benefit schemes is ‘Pay As You Go’ (PAYG) …  A defined-benefit pension system may,
if desired, accumulate a capital reserve by collecting contributions in excess of benefits paid out, in which
case it is said to be ‘partially funded’ ”. (MacKellar and McGreevey, op.cit. p. 6). For Korea the reserves at
the end of 1998 were about eight percent of GDP and expected to grow, from a system installed in 1988.
(Aid-Memory by the Pension Mission of the World Bank, 1998).
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names describes, is an occupational government program for civil servants, military
personnel, and private teachers15. Some reforming efforts have been pursued and
modifications have been introduced from the original scheme established in 1988.
The OPS covers Civil Servants (1960), Military Personnel (1963), and Private Teachers
(1975).16 The NPS includes all other kind of professionals that are not part of the OPS
and operates under the supervision of the Ministry of Health and Welfare. Some
important differences arise from these two basic schemes:
Table 1.
Structure of the Korean Public Pension Scheme
(ths. person, billion won)
Type of System Contributors Beneficiaries Reserves by 1998
NPS(’98) 7,126 674 37,465
Civil Servants(’98) 952 89 4,784
Military(’97) 155(app.) 52(app.) Deficit: 0.7 trillion won
Teachers(’98) 206 6 3,448
Source: Moon (lecture notes, 1999)
  
Anyhow their structure is similar in many aspects and the contribution rate also. But there
are another distinctive aspects that have to be mentioned:
National Pension Scheme (NPS)
                                                                
15 In Korea the law gives practically the same status to private and public teachers, with slight differences,
that is why they are considered inside the Occupational Pension Scheme as civil servants.
16 The majority of public service pension schemes appear to be financed on unfunded pay-as-you-go
principle, where current receipts finance current demands for pension payments.
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a) Benefits: they include Old Age, Survivor, Disability Pensions, and Lump Sum
Refund.
b) Structure: has a redistributive function based on an income-proportional system.
c) The amount taxed is close to the total wage.
d) The replacement rate is 30 percent for 20 years of contribution, 45 percent for 30
years of contribution, and 60 percent for 40 years of contribution of the average of
lifetime wage. (This replacement rate was 35, 53 and 70 percent respectively before
the reforms of 1998)
e) The contribution rate is 9 percent of the salary.
f) The age at which you can be eligible for the benefit is 60 years (age that is going to
be increased gradually up to 65 years by 2033.)
g) This scheme is subject to indexation based on the consumer price index (CPI).
Each of the benefits is self explanatory except for the Lump-Sum Refund, which is a little
more complicated to understand. It works as an insurance payment for the first
generations close to retire who do not qualify for the benefits or do not meet the basic
quota. This refund is just temporary and a proposal for its elimination is one of the main
reforms to help financing the funds.
Occupational Pension Scheme (OPS)
a) Benefits: Retirement, Survivor Pension and Lump-sum Compensation.
b) Structure: its income is proportional (percentage of income)
c) The contribution base is about 80 percent of total wage.
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d) The contribution rate is 15 percent since 1999.
e) There is no restriction in age to qualify for the benefits.
f) This is indexed to wage sliding (the problem here is that wages normally increase
faster than CPI, so level of pension can increase as wage increases.)
As it will be seen, even if you use any of the systems mentioned before, this would lead
us to conclude that the benefits are notably generous. Low contributions and high benefits
will end in a big deficit and later depleting completely the reserve funds. Also
considering that Korea has a seniority wage system, the total replacement rate comes up
with something in between 80 to 90 percent of average lifetime income compared with an
average of 50 percent in other upper middle-income economies.
3.1. Some historical facts and relevant issues
At the beginning the NPS was first established in 1988 for companies who had more than
10 employees, and it developed as the number of employees grew.  However, over time
this changed and some enterprises which had only four employees or the ones who were
self-employed also had coverage.
Nevertheless, the self-employed are one of the most problematic issues in Korea. They
account for approximately 40 percent (Moon, 1999) of what Moon called the “blind spot
problem”. The self-employed report around 60 percent of the income of the average
workers. Regardless of the self-employed that account for such a big number, other
workers also underreport their earnings. This group of people normally earns lower
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incomes, and thus is not entitled for the pension scheme; however, they are the ones who
need this plan the most.
Before the 1998 reforms, the NPS offered a 35 percent of replacement rate on average
with 20 years of contribution, 52.5 percent for 30 years of contribution, and 70 percent
for 40 years of contribution. The contribution rate has increased progressively since 1988
from a 3 percent to a 9 percent in 1998.  Then, the replacement rate is high compared to
other OECD countries (an average of 50 percent). People can even recognize that the
elderly in Korea are even better off than in Japan. For instance, a labor law stipulates a
mandatory severance pay, which is a financial responsibility of the employer. In the case
of 40 years of service, the employee has the right to obtain 40 months of his/her final
salary.  So if you add the severance pay to the 70 percent (now 60 percent) of
replacement rate in Korea, this will clearly be far above the international levels by 25 to
30 percent of the ones set by the International Labor Organization (ILO). This generosity
and the prone social security payments create serious imbalances.
The following data reflects the entire picture of the future situation before the reforms:
Table 2.
Pre-reform predictions of deficits
NPS OPS
Civil Servants Private Teachers Military Personnel
Deficit 2023 1998 2015 1975
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Depletion 2033 2001 2022 1977
Source: Moon (lecture notes, 1999)
Table 2 shows that Civil Servants’ fund has already entered in a process of deficit and
will be exhausted by the year of 2001. Therefore this should be a serious concern and
motivation for the government to react. Furthermore, we can observe the Military
Personnel scheme has already been drained in 1977, which means that the government is
supporting all retirees for more than 22 years.
3.2. Problems and Solutions
3.2.1. A first set of problems: The factors that cause the financial insolvency
a) The Aging: This is a serious problem not only in Korea, but also in many other Asian
countries.  Increased life expectancy and medical improvements show impressive
growth and new trends of elderly population for the coming decades.  The elderly are
not being able to support themselves in several countries, even though the purpose of
pension benefits should be to allow the aging to live as independently and safe as
possible.  Nevertheless, policy-makers don’t seem to have an answer to why big
benefits are being given away and why small contributions are being collected in an
era of shrinking resources and a higher number of elderly populations.
 
 In other words, forecasts of the budgetary effects are always complicated. It is
frequently said that demographic transitions will be more pronounced in East-Asian
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economies. Many experts observe that there is high elasticity of spending on medical
care related to GDP, and the coverage of pension systems is enhanced to provide
minimal pension benefits to elderly persons who are not covered.
As a result of all the problems of aging populations fiscal difficulties will come:
“ …net pressures on the budget in the East Asian tigers will become significant only
after 2010. By 2025, the increased elderly dependency rate will exert pressure on
pension budgets. Demands for health outlays will also manifest themselves, but these
will offset by reduced need for education outlays. A net increase in fiscal social
outlays of about 3 percent of GDP can be envisaged by 2025, with further increases
thereafter.”17
b) Structural imbalance: The serious imbalance brought by the misleading actuarial
projections tells us many things. One of those things is that to support the current
benefit level, the fair rate should be 25 percent (current 9 percent). The present value
of payroll tax has to be higher than the present value of benefit (pvt > pvb) to brace
the pensioners.
c) The inefficient management of Pension Funds Reserve: Again Korea shares one of
the problems mentioned before. According to Moon government now monopolizes
the fund and invests in low yield assets.  Two thirds or more have been invested into
the public sector (Moon, 1999) in different forms (ex. loans for government finance)
accounting for approximately 65 percent, and strictly in the welfare sector (ex.
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purchasing national housing fund bonds) for around 5 percent. The remaining 30
percent have been channeled to the banking sector (ex. purchasing public bonds).
Indeed these are investments whose payoffs are smaller than the ones seen in the
market.  Therefore, there is a big distortion in this investing activity and the
supporting evidence is shown by the following data:
Table 3.
Investment of the National Pension Fund: End of 1998
(billion won)
Total Public Sector Welfare Sector Banking Sector
37,465
(100.0%)
26,795
(71.5%)
1,439
(3.8%)
9,231
(24.7%)
Source: National Pension Corporation
Table 3 depicts a biased investment; about a 75.3 percent, goes towards the public and
welfare sectors while the banking sector has only the remaining 24.7 percent. “Only”
because if a private scheme is introduced, private management pensions companies invest
in capital markets eliminating this deformity. (Capital and financial markets will be
described extensively later).
3.2.2. A second set of problems: Social and political obstacles
Besides all the problems we have consider up to this point, there are still other difficulties
that need to be addressed.
                                                                                                                                                                                                
17 Peter S. Heller, Aging in the Asian Tiger Economies, Finance & Development, Washington, June, 1998,
[Online] ProQuest, Order 105364995 (08/12/99), p. 4.
32
a) The discrepancy among scholars, economists and welfare supporters: The scholars
look for efficiency and actuarial-balanced benefits, while the welfare supporters insist
on the grounds of generosity.  In reference to this, showing my personal respect for
the latter group, I believe social policies have to balance both values and principles
with economic results to notably increase welfare.
 
b) The attitude of government officials: The “representatives of the community” do not
see enough incentives for a radical change.  This is due to the short-sighted
authorities that will only give the importance it deserves in 20 or 30 years from now
when a visible crisis cannot escape from the hands of any government. It is well
known that sometimes government officials respond to groups that can influence
them to act, but in this case we have a weak group called the elderly. This is not
because they do not want changes or better benefits, but because they are old people
with scarce resources (wealthy elder do not engage in this kind of activities), and their
ability to lobby is diminished. Many of these elderly groups of people never thought
they were going to have to suffer economically in their future.  However, now they
are having difficulties negotiating and motivating their peers, ending with high
transaction costs for their goals.
 
c) Strong opposition of pensioners: In relation with the topic just mentioned, this poses
a real problem because it reduces the level of benefits. Pensioners and people that will
become retirees soon oppose drastic measures for sure.
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d) Political Populism: This is a persistent pattern that does not diverge from the
explanations given so far. Politicians are always reluctant to reduce current
generations’ benefits or increase contributions via taxes as part of their unreachable
promises because they are looking for future votes.  What happens is an increased
fiscal drain of taxpayers (especially young workers and employers), an
intergenerational transfer of the promises (intergenerational theft), ending with a big
incentive to resist to social security spending. Then, under these circumstances the
only way to accumulate funds seems to be by raising payroll taxes that create large
wedge and conduces unavoidably to deadweight loss.
3.2.3. Solutions: some reform efforts
In 1998 many experts in the field of pensions got together to try to reach a reforming
effort meeting and ended up forming the National Pension Reform Board (NPRB). The
following three alternatives were discussed:
1st Proposal: This focus on the scaling back of the existing formula of benefit. Its
objective was to:
- Maintain the current system, including some changes.
- Reduce the replacement rate from 70 percent to 55 percent. This reformation effort
(1998) partially failed when it was presented to the Parliament, because they only
approved an amendment of just the 60 percent in 1998.
- Gradually increase the retirement age from 60 to 65 years in 2033.
- Over time transform it into a fully funded from a pay-as-you-go system.
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As explained before the Korean Pension Scheme is a partly funded system, (a variation of
the doctrinaire “complete” fully funded as pay-as-you-go system.) Currently the plan
allows people that have contributed for 20 years to retire.
2nd Proposal: This second tier system objective is to provide a basic lump sum or
minimum pension (MP), or basic insurance (BI), and an earnings-related pension (ERP).
It proposes to:
- Give BI to everybody and ERP to all the earners.
- The replacement rate is reduced to 40 percent, divided into 10 percent for the BI and
the remaining 30 percent for the ERP.
- Gradual increase in the retirement age from 60 to 65 in 2033.
- Gradual increase in the contribution rate from 9 percent to 14 percent, until it can
reach a fully funded system (FFS).
 
 This second view can be perceived as a gradual process towards privatization. It is seen
as a partial answer to the “blind spot problem” and that it can also be tax financed rather
than premium financed, which is favorable.
 3rd Proposal: A private system that is fully funded, relying on the individual’s free choice
by contribution accounts. This idea was not emphasized at the time (then not well
planned). Anyhow it has been considered by some scholars as a possible point for the
new agenda in this field. It is characterized by:
- Having earnings-related deposited into individual or group private accounts.
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- Has a defined contribution, having the advantage of being fully funded form the
beginning.
- The contribution rate will be equal to 9 percent. This point is derived from the
theoretical idea of perfect competition among different providers in order to achieve
this premium. Or even as low as 8.33 percent as concluded by the Pension Mission of
the World Bank (1998), as costs tends to be minimized.
  
 This is the radical way to move into the new generation of pension schemes which have
been proved in several Latin American countries, a pioneering model developed in Chile
and followed by other South American countries. For example in Chile the pension
reform involved an overall reduction of the social security contribution from 29.3 percent
to 17 percent. The contribution to the fully funded system is just 10 percent (one percent
higher than the above mentioned nine percent in Korea). However, if the NPS to be
reformed monopolizes the funds, it will have to raise the contribution rate up to 17.25
percent by the year 2032 to overcome the crisis and attain sustainability (Palacios and Sin,
World Bank, 1999). Hence, there is a clear advantage when a close relationship between
earnings and pension benefits can be seen, but this beneficial aspect is absent under a
PAYG system.
 
 Restructuring recommendations have been proposed by the NPRB to the government
during the last two years, having a partial acceptance or a benign neglect from the
authorities. Reform measures for a fund management have also been set and put into
consideration of public officials. The process is moving slowly, but the problem is that
these measures have to be installed quickly, because the funds will be exhausted soon.
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This negative situation has a hidden shadow because it may not have an effect right now
but it will surely have one 20 to 30 years from now.
 
 All the efforts are in the line of thinking of the first proposal made; at least government
officials have adopted that direction.  Moon and some other leading scholars believe that
the reform efforts under the second tier system is a mean to conquer the private system. It
is noteworthy at this point to remember that this is the closest approximation to what my
expectation of change would be; nevertheless is not completely developed and it could
vary in some aspects. It is not the objective of this thesis to compile and criticize the
possible results under other strategies of reform and transition made before. These
motives are the ones that led me to have another point of view which will be explained
shortly.
 
 For this purpose the Chilean case is taken as a model. This country underwent a radical
change; a pension reform that substituted PAYG for a privately managed and non-
distributive fully funded scheme (FFS).  This was complemented by a small state-run
redistributive means-tested minimum pension transfer (a BI, already thought by
reformists in Korea) financed by general taxation.
 
 Before breaking into the next theme, which is privatization, a remarkable commentary
that was made by the Pension Mission of the World Bank for Korea should be pointed
out.  It emphasizes the idea that the fundamental weaknesses of the reformation efforts
are that they target how to avoid depletion of the funds for several decades; thus, do not
solve the problem after that. Although the second plan reform is better than the first one,
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it still has the deficiency of being exhausted at some point in the future. Only if it would
be implemented as a transition procedure, it could justify its presence. That seems to be
the reason why Moon looks carefully to it as a transitional scheme to achieve the third
proposal of the NPRB.
 
Another weakness of the reformation efforts is that it only deals with the NPS and does
not take in account the OPS, which are already in deficit (military personnel) and have
not even being presented in the official consolidated government budget.
CHAPTER IV
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PRIVATIZATION
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“People must see that there is a problem first in order to solve something by
privatization” 18 There has been a rising tide of discontent in many activities developed
under the responsibility of the government as well as skepticism about public enterprises.
People lost confidence in their representatives and authorities and often argued that
government is becoming increasingly ineffective, inefficient and incompetent to manage
public duties. With this discontent comes together the search of alternatives that conduce
to increasing privatization trends over different areas traditionally administered by public
officials.
4.1. Benefits
4.1.1. Insulation of pensions from political risk
Politicians often use pension programs as a device to obtain votes. Insulation from
politicians reduces the risks created in response to fiscal difficulties.
The FFS provides the big advantage of moving the pension funds away from the
government budget.  Public officials normally dispose in an abusive way from pension
funds. Even if they are not used for other destiny related to the fiscal budget, they could
still use them to pay pension benefits for people retiring or to complement its welfare
redistributive policies discouraging people to contribute to the system. In Chile the use of
savings plan has not been used to improve redistribution, even though there was a lot of
                                                                
18 Poole, 1985, cited by Joseph Murphy, The Privatization of Schooling: Problems and Possibilities.
(California: Corwin Press, 1996), p. 67.
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interest and pressure by coal mine workers (one of the top industries and biggest labor
unions in the country.)  19
When the government is in trouble, as funds do not go through its budget there is less
chance that these assets can be used for other purposes.20  The government might adjust
expenditures proportionately, cutting for example defense and also retirement pensions
too. Here we have a big political issue, the defense program. In Korea the government
keeps high defense expenditures because there seems to be no clear solutions for
unification. This is a frontier that can be considered seriously, so possible cuts in defense
will have direct incidence in a very delicate issue.
All the reasons presented show the good turn of the FFS considering political risks. Thus
there are still some other motivations because there is still a chance that some legislative
actions can be taken, and this has marginal risks (either bearing them all or sharing them)
for FFS. When we talk about legislative actions, we’re thinking about a narrow definition
“taxation”. As PAYG are financed by earmark taxes, this requires periodic revisions of
the norms and rules and constant upgrading of taxes to meet contributions with the level
of benefits. At this point, negative lobbying or “under-the-table negotiations” can proceed,
hampering good initiatives by some groups. Lobbying is inefficient from the economics
point of view because it creates a misallocation of the resources (money and time spent in
lobbying). If for the good sake of some, a dogmatic reform is made that will favor the
                                                                
19 Peter Diamond, “Insulation of pensions from political risk”, chap. 2 in The Economics of Pensions,
edited by Valdez-Prieto, Salvador, op.cit. p.34.
20 It does not mean they cannot be taxed, because the government has the authority to do so. But, taxation
takes time, until a law can be passed in the Congress. In the mean time individuals will take some measures
to adjust to the future changes in advance.  Is to be considered also, that taxation is limited in the sense that
countries’ constitutional rules prohibit confiscatory taxes.
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pensioners the effects of the law can be delayed. Therefore the effects are not visible,
even though the law was enforced (many government institutions or budget assignments
are set, but difficult to see instantly). Policymakers have to think that when new and high
benefits are to be given, the inflationary processes overcome the increase of the pension
level. Again, if lobbying occurs and the legislature seems to be hardly influenced, poor
outcomes can be seen.
Among other problems there is the one related to government’s failure to pay its debt
with the institution that is responsible for managing the funds. For example, in Ecuador
the government has signed several agreements to repay the huge debt that has
accumulated through out time, which is approximately $6.3 billion dollars.21
Finally, with the individual accounts that FFS works these can be insulated from state
intervention, as a consideration of the right of “private property.” These could also be
well developed by national constitutions, international declarations, and organizations
that support them.  The advantage with this approach is that as they become private
property, they receive the same treatment as other assets that are far from government
officials’ hands. This is definitely a big concern which countries such as Canada, Ireland,
Japan, Norway, and the United States search constantly for new initiatives to insulate
funds and improve returns (World Bank, 1999).
                                                                
21 La estrategia del nuevo IESS para eliminar el saldo rojo, Semanario LIDERES, late ed., [Quito], May
1999,p. 3.
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4.1.2. There are positive effects on quantitative on long run output and welfare
effects of mandatory pension systems and reforms
A study presented by Cifuentes and Valdez-Prieto shows some realistic figures that can
be obtained for representative economies (including Korea, others refer to the United
States), including a big group of myopic and credit-constrained individuals.
Table 4.
Effects of Substituting PAYG by FFS in Representative Economies
Steady State Effects of Substituting PAYG by FFS in Representative Economies
Output Change Welfare Change
With Credit Constraints
75% Debt, 25% Tax-financed Transition Deficit      +7%            +3.4%
Full Tax-Financed Transition Deficit      +21.8%            +16.3%
Source: Table 5.1.D, Valdez-Prieto, p. 134, 1997.
Even when debt financing is large relative to tax financing (75 percent and 25percent respectively), four
study reports a significant long-term output gain of 7 percent. When the transition deficit is fully tax
financed, the long-term output gain rises to 21.8. The latter figure is quite large, a result due in part to two
assumptions: FF savings exemption from income taxation and low stationary GDP growth (1 percent ).
However, the main driving force of the reported 21.8 percent is the presence of a large group of myopes.22
Yet further studies by some other authors show that in the absence of myopes23, long-
term output gains of a tax-financed pension reform when credit-constraints are present
decrease to a single-digit figure.
4.1.3. Formalization of the  work force
 Some findings demonstrate a change in patterns, passing from informal to formal labor
force in Chile’s case, in which the share of independent workers in the labor force (who
                                                                
22 Giancarlo Corsetti and Klaus Schimdt-Hebbel Klaus, “Pension reform and growth,” chap 5 in The
Economics of Pensions, edited by Valdez-Prieto, Salvador, op.cit. 136.
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are not required to contribute to mandatory pension scheme) has declined from 26
percent to an average of 24.5 percent. More direct evidence can be seen from the
following trend.
Figure 3.
    (*Data for 1986 to 1989 not available)- Source: Table 5.3 Valdez-Prieto, p. 147, 1997.
Figure 3 shows that the share of informal labor force dropped from 36 percent in 1980 to
31.1 percent in 1990-1992. A reduction of the 4.9 percent, this is a contrasting trend from
the one seen in other Latin American countries such as Argentina or Colombia, whose
direction is going in an opposite way with increases in the informal activities.
Formalizing the labor market will increase government revenues by collecting taxes (this
sector is regulated, hence taxed). At the same time, this taxes can be employed for
redistributive policies for the poor; thus reducing income inequality and improving
welfare. It will reduce the rate of evasion, a problem that increased rapidly after the
                                                                                                                                                                                                
23 Here myopes stands for those people who are shortsighted, considered as the inability to take what
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Financial Crisis of 1997, when almost one out of ten workers laid-off due to the
conditions requested by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as part of the bail-out
program passed to the informal sector. This cadre of self-employed owning “small
business”, or similar lucrative activities are difficult to tax. They “shall be” an important
source of revenues for the government. Their income is around 60 percent of the average
wage of a salaried worker. This group of the labor force is specially shirking the value-
added tax, difficulty that pushed the Korean government to look for a tax reform. This
standpoint was the conclusion obtained by Hyun (1999), who said: “The different levels
of compliance between wage earners and self-employed led to unequal tax burdens.
… The special treatment of small businesses in the VAT system has been criticized as a
systemic source of tax evasion. Although the special treatment was designed to help small
businesses, an unexpected consequence is the high level of tax evasion.”24
This is beneficial for the Korean case because as we saw, it reduces the informal sector,
made up by the self-employed. Still, many workers do not care or simply underreport
their earnings, and then they have the implicit guarantee from the government to be
entitled to a basic insurance with almost no contribution at all. So, it could seem positive
for other countries but not for Korea. That is not true because as long as the people start
to realize that they receive large benefits from the private funds, they would hire workers
and push their employers to legalize their situation looking forward for a secure and
stable life when they retire.
                                                                                                                                                                                                
society thinks will be the proper measures for the future due to any kind of social limitations.
24 Jin-Kwon Hyun, Tax reform in Korea: Government proposal an evaluation and the future, The Korea
Herald, 26 Aug.1999, A2.
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4.1.4. Reduced labor costs
There are efficiency gains in the labor markets with FFS through the changes in labor
supply and resource allocation decision, in response to new incentives in the factor and
product markets.  PAYG tends to raise gross labor costs. The costs of the former scheme
can be avoided by shifting to less labor-intensive technologies or informal markets as
well. Undoubtedly, FFS can have a positive effect because in the event of crises,
unemployment is less likely to occur unlike what happened in 1997 and 1998.
A counter argument for this proposition can arise. There is transfer of the costs (half of
the employers’ contribution to the pension scheme) to the workers. They will then receive
higher wages, but at the end decreasing the contribution will take them back to the same
level they were before. This is a simple criticism that sounds quite convincing, but the
issue here is not only that they will have to pay, but that they will be free to choose the
provider they prefer (freedom and choice will be discussed latter). For the sake of the
argument, even though the workers will have to pay for their social security, they can
choose freely from the different providers in the market. Certainly they will be better off
if they receive better and more efficient pension benefit (yields that come from
investment in the capital markets). Like additional services and other advantages that
compared to the ones the government is providing, it will definitely be much more
satisfactory. Currently in Chile most workers see their contributions as “deferred
compensation” rather than as a tax burden.
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4.1.5. Increasing saving and capital stock
Despite the high savings rate in Asian economies, it has independently been proven to
increase with private pension system. Consequently, as far as savings could keep
increasing the capital stock, much more investment will be seen. Probably someone can
argue that we should not pay much attention to the Asian economies because they have a
strong tendency to save traditionally.  Then my question is that conditions in the world
markets are changing very rapidly, can anyone guarantee that patterns of savings of
future generations would be the same? Is there any sure projection of a certain behavior
of new comers? “There is tremendous variation and little predictability in how much care
people will actually require for how long a period. To save for long-term care is
therefore inefficient: some people will save too much, others too little.”25  The objective
here is not to invoke controversy but to leave everyone the task to think about it. Recall
the basic of economics that if there is more saving, the economy can achieve higher
levels of investment. FFS raises savings and eliminates market distortions, thereby
increasing long-term growth and welfare levels.
FFS appears as a suitable way to manage saving because pure “private insurance”
(referred to international insurance companies) remains too costly for most people who
need long-term care. Also putting your savings under your mattress does not sound
rational.
                                                                
25 Judith Feder,  Improving Public Financing for Long-Term Care: The Political Challenge, Journal of
Aging & Social Policy, vol. 10.3 (1999): p. 2.
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In addition to what was mentioned, it is interesting to share the main results of a
particular study conducted at the KIPF by Chun (1998). He found out that “not even in
the presence of tax incentives under the current pension system in Korea (NPS only), it
can increase saving, it would only be a change of savings into other kind of financial
assets”.26
  
4.1.6. Efficiency gains obtained in capital markets
Gains come in the form of different financial instruments and products by the
liberalization and suppression of financial repression. Again, it seems to be a sound
measure used frequently to accomplish the reformist targets under the Bank Structural
Adjustment Loan I (SAL I) of the World Bank, and conditions imposed by the IMF to
Korea trying to achieve corporate governance. It will unavoidably contribute fulfilling
main goals of economic restructuring agreed by international analysts and government’s
advisors.
Private pension schemes fuel the capital markets by the interaction of different investors,
especially institutional investors (IIs), these are mainly pension fund management
companies, life insurance companies, and investment trusts.
“This is a two way street, minimum IIs and capital market development is required to
support viable funded pension system while the development of the latter is key for
adding depth, liquidity and innovation to the capital market, for further IIs, and for
                                                                
26 Young-Jun Chun, The personal income tax and some features of taxation in pensions, Public Finance
lectures, School of Public Policy and Global Management, KDI, Seoul, 27 Sept. 1999.
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improving corporate governance.”27  This will provide transparency to the capital
markets and assist enterprises on their efforts of restructuring.
Even though Korea’s economy is one of the largest in the world, it presents peculiar
features.  A remarkable one is related to the way of investing private savings. In other
countries like the United Sates, United Kingdom, or Chile these funds are predominantly
invested in securities market instruments like bonds or shares. In Korea they have been
mostly invested in assets, which are not traded in the securities market. This deficiency
accompanied with other bureaucracy traps do not conduce Korea to a policy that can built
up capital and further financial market development.
If the new pension system is implemented, a different variety of gains can be seen
throughout the achievement of beneficial aspects in different parts of the financial market.
 a) Pension Funds: The main goal will be the reduction of an excess bureaucracy in
which you have a series of diverse stages and instances to take decisions and of course
this implies a big number of workers devoted to this kind of activities. To show this
excess burden can be eliminated, it is convenient to describe how complex (inefficient) is
the operative mechanism of the current National Pension Fund. This conclusion is driven
partially from the exorbitant number of institutions and people involved in it. This can be
better understood when examining the following picture:
The fund is regulated and supervised by the Committee of National Pension Fund Operation (CNPF).
The Minister of Finance and Economy is the Chairman of the CNPF and the Minister of Health and
Welfare is the Vice-Chairman. The compulsory members of the CNPF are the ministers of agriculture
and forestry, industry, and labor; other members include two representatives of the employers through
the heads of the employers’ organizations, two representatives of employees through the respective
                                                                
27 World Bank, Aid-Memoire by the Pension Mission of the World Bank , Annex 2, (Washington D.C. July 5,
1998) p. 45.
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chairman of a trade and industrial union associations, three representatives of farmers and fishermen,
the president of the National Pension Corporation (NPC) as the representative of the pensioners, and
two experts in public pensions. The Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW), based on the
regulations issued by the CNPF, establishes the fund operation scheme and supervise the NPC. Finally,
the Minister of Health and Welfare to operate the NPF entrusts the NPC. However, since the enactment
of the Pension Fund Management Law in 1993, the power of the CNPF has been weakened.
In order to finalize the fund operation scheme, the MOHW consults with the CNPF, the Minister of
Finance and Economy, the State Council, and requests approval from the President. By April of every
year, in agreement with the approved fund operation scheme, the MOHW has to present guidelines of
the NPF operation for the coming year to the CNPF, which has to approve it by the end-May. The
early guidelines are then sent to the NPC. The guidelines, among other matters, define the investment
policy, including the distribution by sectors (public, financial, welfare) and by products (e.g. equity,
bonds). In turn, the NPC produces the monthly fund operation plan, operates the fund with the monthly
approval from the Minister of Health and Welfare, and reports the results to the CNPF quarterly. At the
end of the year, the NPC also conducts an audit of the statement of the accounts of the fund with
certified public accountant (CPA), and reports it to the Ministers of the MOHW and MOFE, the Board
of Audit and Inspection, and the National Assembly. Then, the Minister of Health and Welfare inform
about the results to at least one daily economic newspapers with main office located in Seoul.28
By avoiding the excessive bureaucracy and dysfunctional agencies and institutions, it is
possible to have a NPC that will focus on its main functions for which it was created. The
NPC will guide prudential investment, hedging against long-term pension liabilities of
the global pension fund in order to guarantee the elderly security and become more
efficient in its administrative duties.
b) Investment Trust Companies: At this level we would encounter the positive aspect. In
other words, if the system is implemented this will ensure the complete segregation of the
managed funds form the managing company. This advantage does not prevail today,
where confusion is seen between the assets of the account holders and the funds of the
management companies (Investment Trust Companies).  This means that the system will
have to adopt a mechanism of assets according to the market prices. Also this will be
completely favorable for the development of the mutual fund industry, which was already
in the agenda of the government’s by July of 1998.
                                                                
28 World Bank, Aid-Memoire by the Pension Mission of the World Bank , op.cit. p. 51
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c) Life Insurance: The premiums that insurance companies charge to the customers are
extremely high. In 1998 they made revenues of more than 48.8 trillion wons, accounting
for almost 11.7 percent of GDP.  How can this be possible after a year of crisis to end up
with such figures? It is not right. So why are these companies are performing as banks, or
providing loans when this is not their statutory objective.
The other problem is the one related to the former issue that made these companies slide
into insolvency difficulties since 1994.  This is said to be another of the paternalist
activities of the government to support chaebols as well as the government itself.
d) The bond market: The bond market will accomplish important progresses after the
reform. It will gain liquidity and will standardize its term maturities for bonds, giving the
secondary market the possibility to develop more efficiently.
An introduction of efficient rating agencies will play a predominant role by the
assessment of credit risk replacing the common Korean banking guarantees provided by
relying on the name of the borrower, and at the same time increasing viable monitoring
mechanisms. Some multinational foreign credit rating agencies for sure will establish
subsidiaries for this purpose.
e) Equity Market: This market will be enhanced by the private pension systems as they
allow the players to set the rules of the game themselves. Self-regulatory efforts are even
pushed by the Korea Securities Dealers’ Association (KSDA), who currently is officially
recognizing its own regulatory organizations as it happens around the globe. Nevertheless,
50
the government has some constraints for self-regulatory organizations because it does not
bestow the KSDA enough authority to regulate and supervise its members.
This is a difficult task because it is renowned that in Korea the board of directors of
financial institutions usually interferes with the management of enterprises.  Corporate
governance will be fostered by the changes coming from the targets that the new system
tries to attain.
Finally, I will like to attribute the recommendation made by the Pension Mission in order
for markets to achieve desirable targets, implying the following:
… in the short run, pension funds should load their portfolio primarily with market-based government
backed securities, private sector asset backed securities, Korean corporate bonds issued in foreign
markets, while allocating a small fraction of their portfolios in investment-grade private papers in the
Korean capital markets. In the medium-term, as uncertainties from restructuring of corporate and
financial intermediaries start to be dissipated, financial innovation is introduced, and regulations and
supervision of financial intermediaries strengthened, pension funds should find it more attractive to
start investing a larger proportion of their portfolios in private securities. This shift would also be
induced because the supply of new public debt would be slowing down; hence the yield differential
would increase in favor of private papers. In the long-run investment in foreign securities would also
be available, and pension funds should take advantage of this opportunity to diversify risks of their
portfolio by investing in markets whose returns have relatively low or negative correlation with the
Korean capital markets return. 29
  
4.2. Other social considerations
This section will be devoted to describe some of the most important problems in the
process of new private schemes and the relations with the Korean situation.
4.2.1. The optimum amount of pension benefit
This is a problem that has always been there. Pensions were created to replace wages, as
people get older.  Pensions are calculated as a percentage of gross earnings and in other
                                                                
29 World Bank, Aid-Memoire by the Pension Mission of the World Bank ,op.cit.. P.46.
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cases, as net earnings after contributions. The problem in Korea is that the components of
the salary are too disperse, so it is difficult to have a precise idea of how much can be
obtained from the employees’ salaries. For example, the replacement rate is fixed to 60
percent for 40 years of contributions. Moreover, households differ in terms of needs,
targets, and preferences. Consequently, some people will be satisfied with 60 percent, but
others will not be pleased even with a 100 percent. If they have the chance to invest
privately their funds, they can be able to ask for pensions that pay over an established
percentage according to their past income.
4.2.2. The impact of financing on saving for a first group of pensioners
Younger generations are the ones to support the elderly.  They have to pay in a form of
payroll tax the money that older people receive in the form of benefits; thus, reducing
capital younger people can save.
As it was mentioned before, first generations receive higher pensions than the latter ones.
Younger generations receive generous benefits and especially the so-called “baby
boomers” (people between 30 to 50 years of age), who make their own cost-benefit
analysis that determines high returns for them. “Most Koreans who were old when their
system was established in 1988 will have died by the time the system pays out its first full
benefits. In such cases the scheme accumulates a partial reserve in its early years, with
the largest benefits likely to be received by people who are 30 to 50 years old when the
scheme was introduced-the founding generations. They pay contributions for only part of
their working live but collect generous pensions for many years.”30 They see that the
                                                                
30 World Bank, Averting the Old Age Crisis, op.cit. p. 325.
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amount received when the system is implemented is higher than the contributions they
made. For that reason, this could cause that savings rate can fall because they would like
to borrow against their future income stream that is definitely better.  “If they anticipate
this transfer, they might try to borrow against their future pensions to consume more
when they are young, further reducing national saving.  If the country has deliberately
chosen to improve the income of these groups, national welfare improves, but the price is
lower saving and growth for future generations.”31
One of the main issues here is that this saving is reduced, whether this is true or not, some
empirical studies have shown low impact on savings for Canada, France, Japan, Germany,
among others. Still public saving is indeed hampered.
Normally the government borrows against this public managed pension fund at lower
interest rates than the market is doing it. In addition to this, generally these kinds of funds
are forced by law to be invested in public bonds, which yield low or even negative real
returns.  It’s necessary then to let people decide whether to choose where to invest as an
alternative of inefficient and badly planned government investments. The difference
between public and private systems is the possibility to isolate them from government
intervention and properly channel those funds into long-term investments in capital
markets.
  
4.2.3.  Administrative costs
                                                                
31 World Bank,  Averting the Old Age Crisis, op.cit. p. 307.
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In other words this reminds us of the classic rule of higher costs, lower benefits. Private
managers are by definition profit-seekers, this means minimizing the costs or maximizing
the profits.  This is an observable advantage of the private pension plans if compared to
public plans. Government requires an extremely well trained and prepared bureaucracy to
deal with this problem, a thing that is rarely seen in developing countries.
It looks simple if we consider this point, but we have to be careful when supporting the
idea. A one-sided position is not fair, as some counter arguments can conclude. When the
government through its respective agency is in charge of administrating pensions, it
subsidizes the institution in various ways. For example telephone bills, zero rent payment,
and many other services can also become a comparative advantage for state-owned
pension provider.  At the same time, it should be taken into account that bureaucracy is
not prepared to take advantage of these resources and there are no incentives for
managers to be efficient. Additionally, it is seen that public systems try to charge extra
premiums for longevity, which offsets all the saved costs and will be passed implicitly to
society. Eventually another problem is that they keep investing in low yield financial
products.  In contrast, private companies try to accumulate reserves and diversify their
portfolio. The idea that prevails in private insurance is the efficient allocation of capital.
Disregarding the above-referred advantage of efficiency over subsidies, many opponents
have other arguments that are adamant about change in the name of redistributional
grounds. Others concentrate in the effectiveness of minimization of costs arguing in what
seems to be very convincing. Are there really reduced costs in private scheme? What will
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happen with all the money invested in marketing and sales? They make up a large part of
companies’ budget and represent an important percentage of total administrative costs.
This story is in part true as some figures have been calculated and experienced as well.
For example for the same Chilean case, initially “ …administrative costs were extremely
high. In 1984 it accounted for 9 percent of the wages, or 90 percent of the contributions
to the retirement system!  By 1994, however, costs had declined significantly, amounting
of 1 percent of wages or 10 percent of the retirement system”32. Edwards also cite some
other calculations made by distinguished scholars showing convincing findings, with the
natural problems and variations from year to year. For example Bustos (1995) found that
the total costs of the new regime are 42 percent lower than the average costs of the old
PAYG system. Another supporting evidence in terms of accumulated assets by
Margozzini (1995) who encountered that administrative costs have declined from almost
15 percent in 1983 to 1.8 percent in 1993, including sales costs.
Although we can see the aforementioned evidence, still some other academics such as
Diamond (1993) argue that the Chilean system still receive low marks for its high
administrative cost compared the “inefficient” system that was replaced. He found that
the cost per person in the Chilean is far above the one reported by the U.S. Social
Security Administration for the case of define benefit system. For Diamond some of the
advantages shown by the state-run pension system lies upon different elements. The main
ones are the economies of scale a well-administered program can attain, the large
expenses that private firms employ in advertising and marketing the products, and a
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market demand less sensitive to variations on price, that can be seen in competitive
markets. He also attributes to part of these high costs the weakness of individual investors
to obtain discounts compared to employers (collective investors choosing an AFP for all
their workers). Yet employers are not natural organizers and also are likely to comprise
with a specific AFP, thus ending up with corruptive activities. Nevertheless, Diamond
himself considers that: “Countries can do worse than imitating Chile (and many have). I
have argued that countries choosing to privatize can do better by recognizing that the
private market is an expensive institution …”33
  
4.2.4. Taxes and evasion problem
This is a problem that can be discussed in a whole thesis itself, thus, a summary of the
most important issues follows.
Governments around the world usually have problems raising taxes and more when
countries are facing crisis.  This limited power of taxation, the inefficient civil servants,
plus the different ways of evasion pose a serious difficulty to raise funds for pensions.
We should not forget that it is predicted that payroll taxes (includes income tax and social
security contributions) raise costs of employing labor above the wage paid.  Also income
taxes and employees’ social security contributions reduce the return to workers. A rise of
social security payments will reduce the aggregate demand for labor  “An increase in
social security contributions can also result in unemployment when workers resist
                                                                                                                                                                                                
32 Sebastian Edwards, The Chilean Pension Reform: A pioneering program, Working Paper 5811, National
Bureau of Economic Research (Cambridge: November 1996), p. 17.
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offsetting wage cuts”.34  This is true when we have rigid labor markets; because in the
case of flexible ones, getting the right clearing market wage level can offset any increase
in the tax wedge.
It is proposed theoretically that increases in social security payments add extra burden for
the poor by raising the global tax wedge. On the other hand, this does not have much
effect to people with higher incomes because you can observe ceilings for contributions.
Visible negative effects from wrong levels of taxation are being seen.  Empirical studies
show that social security contributions for some European countries like France, Sweden,
Italy, or Spain are 25 percent higher, contributing to put upward pressures for higher
wages, increasing labor cost, hence reducing employment (OEDC Jobs Study, 1994).
Many conclusions about the current topic are part of a big discussion yet. I consider very
crucial the following extract completely, to illustrate this point:
The increases in employers’ contributions that have taken place in several countries will have
increased labour costs in those countries where labour markets are relatively inflexible.  Consideration
might be given to inclusion of non-labour income in the contribution base for employer’s contributions.
But it is not just the levels of employers’ payroll contributions, which sometimes seem
counterproductive; the structure of such contributions should also be re-examined. By typically levying
contributions on the first unit of income earned and reducing the rate of contributions above certain
income level, the result is an in-built bias towards employment of high-income workers and use of
overtime rather than employing low-skilled workers. Such contributions ceilings are often justified as
reflecting benefit entitlement.  35
Along with the point of taxation we come with the idea of evasion. If benefits are not
closely linked to contributions, people frequently evade mandatory pension schemes. If
the government imposes a tax and it does not reflect an adequate benefit level, you are
likely tempted to shirk legal obligations.  The incentives to evade are greater when social
                                                                                                                                                                                                
33 Peter Diamond, Privatization of Social Security: Lessons from Chile, Working Paper 5811, National
Bureau of Economic Research (Cambridge: November 1993), p.26.
34 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD, OECD Jobs Study: Facts, Analysis
and Strategies, (Paris: OECD 1994.), p. 240
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security contributions add extra burden to employers or employees, plus there is a lower
probability of being caught. In other words, it is merely the opportunity cost of the heavy
weight that a new tax imposes and the offsetting benefit attained by the inherent (low)
punishment that the evader can be subject off.   A World Bank study (World Bank, 1994)
found that because of the increased evasion a 1 percent point raise in contribution rate led
to a 2 percent point drop in total receipts.  There are several ways to evade, the most
remarkable ones are underreporting, delaying contribution payments, and even simply
refusing to comply.
a) Underreporting earnings: This is not computing the total amount of benefits a person
is receiving as part of the salary. There are many fringe benefits, extra income streams
not in the form of cash. For example vehicles provided by the company, or free housing,
among others. These hidden earnings can reduce abruptly the amount of receipts. In
allusion to this point, this is broadly surveyed in Korea, where the composition of the
salary is not precisely determined, so evasion is possible.  In this category of evasion we
have the self-employed, lawyers, doctors, taxi drivers, and many others that keep much of
their earnings out of sight.
  
Another proof of this evasive tendency was evidenced as well with direct implications in
the pensions issue that can be read in an article published by the Korea Times, April 21,
1999. The paper mentions that according to the Representative of the opposition Grand
National Party, Hong-Shin Kim: “The actual payment of pension is expected to be lower
than the government-promised sum, as more than 70 percent of the new subscribers this
                                                                                                                                                                                                
35  OECD, op.cit. p. 274 - 275
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year made false reports of their incomes … .” Kim’s argument was based on the
discrepancy of the Health-Welfare Ministry’s original estimate of the average income
level at 1.27 million won earned each month and the actual figure now set at 1.09 million
(Korea International Labour Foundation –KOILAF-, Korea Labor News, 1999).
b) Delaying the contribution: This is perceived as the idea that one dollar today will not
be a dollar tomorrow and especially when more countries go through inflationary crisis.
Employers delay their obligations and even present legal actions to engage in judicial
processes that will last for long time, hiring corrupt lawyers to do the work. This is
serious if in addition the country has a poor judicial system that cannot address
procedures rapidly, and that at the end can only charge low interests that does not
overcome the imbalance created early.
 
c) Simply refusing to comply: It is just not paying because you have insignificant
penalties or lack law enforcement.
All of these kinds of evasion or delayed payments leave the government with no liquidity
to finance their budget and again this can be to some extent the cause for budget deficits.
4.2.5. Early retirement
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One of the main ironies in this case is that people in poor countries are allowed to retire
early (even life expectancy has increased). Women are also able to retire earlier than men,
even though they normally live longer than men do.
It is not necessary to be good in mathematics to realize that if you know many workers
retire before the average retirement age receiving top benefits, the pension’s reserves will
decline. There should be a necessary balance between eligibility to retire (years of
contributions and minimum age) and benefits to get.  Early retirement in terms of
actuarial calculus is a serious figure to consider.
Public pension plans and retirement patterns differ among countries. For example in the
United Sates, workers are eligible for social security at the age of 65 and early retirement
at 62 with reduced benefits. The same age (65) is applicable for full public pension plans
for older workers in Sweden. The Japanese case is a little bit different because workers
qualify for the benefits at the age of 60. 36
In this instance more than in other areas, social policies are subject to political promises.
We see that politicians find easy to promise early retirements and high benefits. It is very
attractive to be offered those kinds of things. Nevertheless when people are not able to
collect what they were promised, government will have to bear with the inquiries of an
irritated society. In Korea for instance “ …less than 5 percent of the old are eligible for
public pensions,”37
                                                                
36  Section reference Blank.
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Even if the retirement age would be adjusted, there has to be an optimum point that will
not disrupt the labor market. At this point the elderly should step out of the labor force
and allow new generations to get in. This issue is a very difficult one to manage is
because in many developing countries working populations are not covered by pension
schemes or are defectively covered. Thus they keep working to support themselves. For
example in the Ecuadorian case the replacement rate for pensioners is less than 20
percent.
A common problem worldwide is that early retirement also have undesirable
consequences for distribution of GDP because the main beneficiaries are civil servants
and other privileged groups, and this is observed in the Republic of Korea. Workers in
upper income-level brackets collect the benefits for longer periods, but this is not true for
people with lower incomes because they live longer than their compatriots do.
4.2.6. Intergenerational redistribution
Intergenerational transfer is the income received by one generation at the expense of
another.  We should be careful that this does not turn into a heavy burden for future
generations to carry. Therefore, it should not be at the expense of each other. Lets look at
the principles such as equity and sustainability, because most of the plans are justified
around these supreme fundamentals. The distribution of income across generations has
helped realize that the ability to support themselves has weakened with at age. Factors
beyond their expectations such as inflation, economic recessions, wars, natural disasters,
have definitely affected their abilities.
                                                                                                                                                                                                
37 World Bank, op.cit. p. 323
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This kind of situations can be seen with pay-as-you-go systems, where earlier generations
are better off, but latter generations are worse-off.  Some studies from the United States’
social security have found that more than 15 percent of workers who retired between the
1950s and 1960s have received higher incomes than with any other investment like the
stock or bond market (World Bank, 1994). Then members of what is called “founding
generations” or people who died before the full pension benefit is paid, receive even four
times more than the amount they have contributed through out life. Figure 4 gives a clear-
cut of the referred trend, as follows:
Figure 4.
Source: World Bank, Averting Old Age Crisis, 1994, p. 326
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In this chapter I will explain why Korea should adopt a brand new private system. Some
challenging ideas of this theoretical approach are set for a clear scope of a new pension
model. From my point of view, there is room for the new system applied with relative
success in other countries. It is a basic theoretical framework that could inspire a fresh
wave of thinking. A feasible “way to go” that works over the keystone of privately
managed pensions with operational transportability. For this proposal I have considered
the possibility to establish a very similar model to the one used in Chile, taking in
consideration the differences that should apply for diverse cultures and levels of
economic development.
  
5.1. The criteria for a policy choice
Experts in the economics field have made some technical suggestions to facilitate the
transition process towards assimilation of privately managed systems. As you remember
these are fully funded, so the conditions for implementation must be stable.  Korea seems
to have some clear advantages in terms of economic fundamentals. Even though experts
from the World Bank refer to this fundamentals as necessary for low-income countries
(Korea is not included in this category), it is important to discuss about these and present
some arguments to support the feasibility of the program. For this study some aspects of
the nature of the past financial crisis must be disregarded, while working upon the basis
of a recovering an economy that millions of Koreans hope to have.
5.1.1. Keeping inflation down
This is not a serious problem for Korea, because in the last three decades the country has
demonstrated that it can manage to control this situation. In general, East Asian
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Economies have kept the price level relatively low and that is why so many investors
spur funds into these emerging markets. “During the past thirty years, annual inflation
averaged approximately 9 percent in these economies, compared with the 18 percent in
other low-and-middle income economies. Because inflation was both moderate and
predictable, real interest rates were far more stable than in low-and-middle income
economies”38
5.1.2. Avoiding interest rates and exchange rate controls
This is not a problem at all either by desirable considerations of liberalizing capital
account transactions as a measure of openness, or by the conditions imposed by the IMF
last year, the capital market has not many restrictions left.
5.1.3. Establishing reliable savings institutions that are accessible to people in rural
as well as urban areas
In this case we see no difficulty either. Savings rate and reliable savings institutions are
one of the main pillars of the economic pinnacles of Asian economies.  Just take a look of
the “postal saving systems”, this is just enough proof of competence in this structural
feature.  In addition, savings are not only seen in the household sphere, but also in the
private firms, which is quite peculiar nowadays.
Voluntary saving is not a difficult concept for most East Asian Economies, which are
well known by the high private savings rate. This is a big difference compared to other
developing countries such as the ones in the Latin America.
                                                                
38 The World Bank, The East Asian Miracle, op.cit.  p. 12.
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5.1.4. Developing a regulatory framework that gives people confidence in banks,
insurance companies, and other financial institutions
Several Korean economists disagree that there is a competent, stable and secure financial
system. Conditions are and have to change because lessons were learned after the crisis.
It is difficult to fall in the same mistakes that shook thousands of people in 1997 and
1998. The high rate of unemployment due to the massive layoffs will not be tolerated
again. Therefore, the adjustments need to be made to continue acquiring a sound financial
system combined with evident corporate governance.
Korea has the financial capability to overcome a crisis and its showing it right now.
Another significant thing that we cannot omit is that regulation normally comes after
problems are observed in the market. The regulatory process tries to always follow the
pace of new financial products and institutions that derive from the new requirements and
initiatives of financial brains. I do not think we should worry much, because the time will
come.  We just have to analyze about the Korean economic structure at the end of the 20th
century, which is far above the one Chile had on 1981, and that of other less developed
countries that are trying to experiment with this new model. For that reason it is not true
that the Korean financial market is underdeveloped.
5.1.5. Instituting an effective tax policy and tax administration system
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In my opinion this is the most difficult task. Anyhow, effective tax administration is not
required for this particular case; it is needed for any country to achieve economic growth
and productivity increase.
With FFS you can achieve formalization of the labor force. Passing from an informal
(unregulated and untaxed) to a formal sector (that can be regulated and taxed); thus, the
government can raise its revenues.  Accordingly, we will have to forget of much of the
concerns of evasion. This difficulty is a major concern in developing economies and has
been a seriously acknowledged worldwide.
5.1.6. Building the human capital is essential for the effective management of
financial and regulatory systems
This statement is self-explanatory because the investment in human and physical capital
is also one of the fundamentals of East Asian Economies. Many economists can disagree
in different aspects of East Asian Miracle, but non-of them refute the importance of this
factor in terms of their economic development. Krugman, Rodrik, Sachs, and other
figures have a convergence of thoughts in this point. “In the 1960s, levels of human
capital were already higher in the HPAEs that in other low-and middle-income
economies. Governments built on this base by focusing education spending on the lower
grades; first by providing universal primary education, later by increasing the
availability of secondary education” 39   
                                                                
39 The World Bank, The East Asian Miracle, op.cit. 15.
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At this point, I would like to emphasize a point that will complement the strengths of the
Korean economy. This is the noted lower income inequality compared to other middle-
income economies. To start the process of privatization, the problem encountered by
domestic policymakers are the disparities, even in Chile which has achieved good results,
the starting point was totally different.  Thus, this is a crucial thing some theorists forgot.
That is also why from my point of view, Korea is a good candidate for privately managed
pension scheme.
5.2. The pension proposal for Korea
So far we have discussed the insights of pensions topics with a remark on the virtues of a
private pension model giving room also for some counter arguments. I strongly support
the private view.  The transition and implementation has to be accompanied by
contemplation of consensus for change. The proposal goes more in the line of the third
proposal of the NPRB, which looks at the possibility of individual accounts managed by
private providers of social insurance.
This proposition can be considered in a general perspective described here. A mandatory
saving managed-pension, mixed-scheme with individual transportable accounts over the
basis of a defined-contribution40. This personal accounts are to be managed by private
pension management companies - such as Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones –
                                                                
40 Defined-contribution is different from defined-benefit. The former pays a benefit upon what he/she has
contributed, plus accumulated capital returns, either as a lump-sum, or more commonly, in the form of
annuity. The latter pays a benefit with reference not of how much money the individual has contributed, but
other criterion, such as final salary, the average of the three final years, or the average of the best three best
paid years.
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(AFPs) in Chile - in the case the individual choose a private pension provider or by the
competitive government institution designated for the task. The system should provide a
basic insurance or minimum pension benefit (for low-income individuals financed by
current taxes (as part of a communal welfare program), considering transparent means-
tested program.
After setting the model, a clear description will follow in order to clarify related aspects
of the plan and conducting to a tentative framework of it.
· When referring to “mix” means two different things:
a) The government can also compete with the providers of the services under the same
conditions trying to attract savings. A non-exclusive market for a government in need
to capture part of the idea of equal right of competition.
b) The government playing the role of a supreme democratic authority ready to provide
a minimum pension to low-income elderly.
· The accounts can be moved freely from the government investing institution to the
private management companies and vice versa. But a minimum pension benefit
(MPB) or basic insurance (BI) should be provided to people who do not qualify for
the private plans, over the base of mean-tested programs. At this time a brief
parenthesis needs to be made to explain the merits and demerits of MPB and BI. One
the one hand, MPB is based on a means-tested program which has the characteristic
of being selective (of course a to implement a good means-tested program is a
difficult task). With selective and determined individuals as part of the program, low
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administrative costs can be achieved for the NPC. The con of it is that a moral hazard
situation can pose a big social cost for those who rely on the program in an
irresponsible way.  On the other hand, BI has the advantage of avoiding segregation
and the selective process of means-tested. The problem with this one is that it is more
expensive to administer and impose a big burden into the fiscal budget because it is
given to a larger number of people that under means-tested MPB.
· It will work over a two-pillar system, if in the first pillar we will pay universal BI or
MPB to all workers that qualify according to the number of years of contributions and
the retirement age. The second pillar will be responsible to pay pension benefits that
will include disability and survivors. This will be done by individual accounts
capitalizing the funds and administered by pension fund management companies
and/or by a special technical investing committee (STIC) conformed for that purpose
and an autonomous “Office of the Actuary”. The last one should be independent from
all the government agencies and will report directly to the President and the
Parliament. The last one is an idea given by the Mission of the World Bank that I
think is excellent. Furthermore, this office could monitor the rest of the pension fund
management companies, insurance companies, and all the other types of private
providers that are working in the market.
· The BI or MPB is to be financed by general taxation. The fund will be administered
by the STIC as part of the initiative to make this government institution capable of
investing in financial market products to obtain higher yields.
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· At the initial stage, clear norms should be imposed constraint the freedom of STIC in
order to guarantee the minimal market yields. It should invest in authorized financial
assets under the optimal prudential regulations to diversify their portfolio.
· The establishment of mutual funds should be constituted as the way to canalize the
contributions deposited in the individual accounts; thus, insulating them from
political risk so that the concept of individual property prevails. Then, the registrants
of the program and independent will own the assets from the one own by their
administrators. This is a complete segregation of funds from the management
company’s hands.
·  The pension benefits should be indexed to inflation to maintain the real value of the
benefits received at the current time. No ceilings or tops should be set in order to
create a competitive market offering better returns to investment of the elderly.
· The main characteristic of this system then is the universalization of social security
and the efficient work of the financial markets. Here, everyone is covered by at least
the BI or MPB. The individuals that have salaries above the threshold needed to
contribute to the second pillar (individual accounts) will raise incentives to private
companies to fuel economy. Being part of the first pillar (under the threshold) does
not mean impossibility to obtain benefits that the second pillar pays. This is because
the system uses a complementary financial tool that allows the people covered by the
first pillar to opt for the second by contributing with half of their earnings. This will
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have positive effects on the returns they can obtain without loosing the BI or MPB
that they have the right to get.
   
The creation of this STIC will release the National Pension Corporation (NPC) from a lot
of responsibilities and inadequate functions. The NPC will concentrate and strengthen
upon its basic administrative and procedural functions, such as collecting activity,
updating of workers’ records, and all kinds of activities that can generate accurate
information currently lacking in many areas.
  
Certainly, with this two-pillar system you integrate a universal social insurance that will
be paying benefits to low-income people and also generating competitive long-term
saving markets, that at the end will contribute to enhance both the government SITC and
the financial market. The final outcome will be the complementation of the two pillars,
raising national savings (having enough resources to pay BI or MPB) and creating
transparency, a basic concept pursued in the process of Korean corporate restructuring.
5.3. Conditions to implement a new scheme
5.3.1. Outlook of the portability problem
Doherty (1989) defines portable pension plan as: “ …a pension scheme in which an
employee may transfer credits accrued with one employer to another.” 41 These kinds of
programs were mainly agreements arranged by a group of employers from the same or
different industries. Currently the few individual pension accounts are being held in
                                                                
41 Doherty, Robert E., Industrial and Labor Relations Terms: A Glossary (Ithaca: ILR Press, 1989), p. 26.
71
banks, investment trust funds, and insurance companies. Moreover, they are treated as
another kind of investment income if the account is held for a minimum of 10 years, if
not it is part of the current taxable income. For that reason, this is something that has to
change because the system proposed works independently to this forms of taxable
liability giving freedom, mobility, and access to the another new market, the mutual fund
industry.
The responsibility to contribute to the plan gives the employee a guarantee to obtain their
benefits by the time he/she retires without being afraid to lose them when they have
moved from one job to another. Portability is plausible under a mandatory scheme
between the different individual accounts that are administered by the central government
institution, the trusts, a diverse variety of investment funds used by insurance companies,
or more specifically the private pension management companies.
5.3.2.  Financing transition
A defined-contribution scheme looks good at the beginning because it pays generous
benefits as the market has a determined number of providers investing in a diversified
portfolio whose payoff are well-above the market rates. Yet, what will happen when
market rates start to decline to the world levels and no much gain can be obtained? What
will happen with the problems that come form compliance of the self-employed, people
who underreport earnings and some other not eligible, that at glance are the blind spot
problem? Both questions constitute a large fiscal burden to the state at the time the
government has to pay social insurance and welfare benefits. Currently Korea has an
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immense debt of approximately 200 trillion won (Moon, 1999), almost one-third of the
GDP (See Figure 5).
The figure is somehow misleading because if you compare the debt with the other OECD
countries, it looks small. The problem is that the pension scheme in Korea is a very
young. It only has a little more than eleven years while the rest of the countries
mentioned before have pension and social security systems that are much older (50-60
years on average).
Consequently, it is not an easy topic to discuss and it has very sensitive points to consider,
but several theorists believe in some possibilities that are worth mentioning.
Figure 5.
 
 Source: World Bank presentation, Seoul, Sept. 1999, p. 15
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To finance the transition from a PAYG to a FFS there are two main ways to do it. The
first one is by government budget surpluses (either by taxation or by cutting public
spending). The other way is by issuing new government debt like was suggested by
Corsetti and Schmidt-Hebbel. Issuing any public liability like privatization of state own
enterprises or drawing some reserves or strategic commodity stocks this can be done. In
Korea’s case are not new recipes because they follow the requirements imposed by IMF
in order to lend the money back in 1997. One of these conditions was to privatize state-
owned enterprises (natural monopolies), something that cannot be seen as new, thus is
not new; thus, successful cases have been seen along different countries and decades.
In the United Kingdom during the 1980s and under the Thatcher administration, many
companies that belonged to the government were sold. Some of these companies were
British Airways, British Gas Corporation, and British Telecom, in the eighties. In the
1990s privatization has also been seen in Latin America and Africa. For instance the
telecommunication and other strategic areas that in the past were reserved for the
government, such as health care (very much related with pensions in many ways) and
education. Anyhow, Korea is involved in a series of privatization efforts either by the
external pressures or by own initiatives to achieve efficiency and competitiveness in the
world market. Therefore, I believe these procedures are feasible. “Debt financing implies
that national saving, the capital stock, and intergenerational distribution of welfare are
only marginally affected, by the magnitudes that depend on the net efficiency gains of the
reform.” 42 If you raise taxes the revenues are sometimes negative, others not, but at least
                                                                
42 Giancarlo Corsetti and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, “ Pension reform and growth,” chap. 5 in The Economics
of Pensions, edited by Valdez-Prieto, Salvador, op.cit. p. 132.
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lowly than financing with public debt. This result is revealed in the study of Valdez-
Prieto (See Table 4).
The “recognition bond”
This was a mechanism developed by the government in order to address the problem of
recognizing the contribution of those who had contributed to the old system. The debt
financing that is already huge in terms of social security debt and the blind spot problem
could be solved with this mechanism. For example, the Chilean government at the time of
transition called it the recognition bond, because the transition poses problems, such as:
a) Determination of the rules of workers who will join the program and the ones who
will stay under the old system.
b) Devising a method to credit the contributions of workers made to the old system.
c) Financing the pension payments to old-system retirees.
d) Covering those who remain uncovered.
The new pension law should determine the workers who are able to join the new system.
In Chile the experience was that changing to the new system gave retirees an immediate
increase of an 11 percent which is more than 36 percent of the total employment transfer
to the new system in less than one year of the establishment of the program (Edwards,
1996).
Hence, the recognition bonds were issued to recognize the past contributions and
provided basis for the new retirement fund, including those already retired when the
reform was enacted, as well as those that chose not to switch. The only condition
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imposed to be eligible for the bond was that the worker must have made at least 12
monthly contributions into the old system during the previous 5 years. The bond paid
large sums of money and was deposited in the individual accounts even these yield 4
percent in real terms.
This generated a major source of public spending, in-cash costs that peaked in early 1983
(2 years later of reform), and represented 4.58 percent of GDP. Even though the
expenditure on the recognition bonds have increased (expected to decrease from 2010),
the costs as a total of GDP and the cash transfer started to decline since 1984 and are
projected to keep doing it in next decades. Table 5 gives us a clear view of the trend.
Table 5.
Fiscal Impact of Social Security Reform; Its Effect on the Deficit of the Old System
(percentage of GDP)
Year Cash Deficit Recognition
Bonds
Total
1981 1.47 0.01 1.48
1982 4.08 0.11 4.19
1983 4.58 0.22 4.80
1984 4.55 0.25 4.80
1985 4.27 0.30 4.57
1986 4.33 0.41 4.74
1987 4.35 0.49 4.84
1988 4.23 0.50 4.73
1995 3.10 0.80 3.91
2000 2.57 0.94 3.51
2005 1.84 0.99 2.83
2010 1.19 0.80 1.99
2015 0.80 0.40 1.20
Source: Edwards, NBER, 1996, Appendix.
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On that account, some scholars have argued that these liabilities are very large and come
from the government’s pocket. Experts think that a new system will not be applicable in
other countries (Mesa Lago, 1996).  To agree with this statement, the policy makers and
the society have to make a transparent and precise benefit-cost analysis and encounter the
convenience or inconvenience of it. Anyhow, according to the question formulated by
Edwards, a change is needed even if some costs are higher because like many other these
trade-off in real life. “Is it worthwhile maintaining a compulsory, and in most cases
largely inefficient, government run pay-as-you-go system along side a privately managed
one, in order to avoid the fiscal costs of transition?”43 What are the long-term effects of
keeping something spoiled? Why not take the experience of other countries and correct it
on time?
Prudential regulation and technical reserves
From the beginning the government should impose a prudential regulation on the type of
assets the funds could invest. At an initial stage, clear concepts and definitions have to be
given in order to protect the contributors and provide them with a high degree of
confidence on the system. For example in Chile, a minimum rate of return was offered,
paying the contributor either a 50 percent of the average return across AFPs, or 2
percentage points below the average (which ever is higher). Those AFPs that do not meet
the minimum required were obliged to make up the difference withdrawing it from an
“investment reserve” created specifically for this purpose. Thus, it is recommended to
establish a “Pension Fund Guarantee”, that is a reserve fund which has to be constructed
by the payments made by the private managed pension funds at the time they are
                                                                
43 Sebastian Edwards, The Chilean Pension Reform: A pioneering program, Working Paper 5811, National
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constituted. In Chile this was part of the financial reform that mandated not only to
deposit a certain percentage of the fund (one percent of the value of the pension fund),
but also to deposit a minimum capital and reserve requirements depending on the number
of affiliates. The AFP was required as well to disclose the operative method used to set
its investments.
There should be created a Pension Fund Guarantee, so that the population can know there
is financial support for the firm in the market and can pay their benefits in the event of a
bankruptcy.  A complementary mechanism works in Chile as a mean of protection for the
reserve. This reserve that could be 1 percent or more of the total value of the fund
(depending on actuarial calculus) is invested in a portfolio that exactly mimics that of the
fund. If an AFP cannot meet a profitability shortfall out of its reserves, it is liquidated
(Edwards, 1996). The stake makes up the difference between the actual and minimum
guaranteed return and then contributors transfer their funds to another AFP.  There was
also a maximum allowable return, determined as 50 percent or 2 percentage points over
the average across AFPs. Those companies that exceed the maximum have to deposit the
excess funds on a “profitability reserve”, which is part of the fund’s (and not the
management company’s) assets. If in a subsequent year the AFP’s portfolio
underperforms, this reserve can be used to make up the difference between the actual and
minimum return. Some of these ideas could be adopted to build a new scheme.
                                                                                                                                                                                                
Bureau of Economic Research (Cambridge: November 1996), p.28.
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5.3.3. Adjusting the rest of the programs to a new one
There are different ways to consolidate the diverse kind of systems, especially the
occupational ones.  It has to be done depending on the country, but considering either
gradual or “cold turkey” actions. To give some ideas lets cite the American case, a
process that during the 1980s improved flexibility and portability for the Federal
employees. However, other cases like the Ireland one took drastic measures and ended all
types of preferential programs for civil servants.
Some other countries like Chile, Uruguay, and Peru have taken steps to terminate the
civil service preferential scheme for new employees as part of the process of
implementing pension reform for their national systems.  Some OECD countries have
adopted a less radical approach by integrating public servants into the general social
insurance scheme and linking flat-rate pension to an earnings-related occupational
scheme.44  This reduction of preferential plans contributes, in a great extend, to the
reduction of the burden of public employment and a form of cutting public deficits.
To conclude, in regard to the principles of unity and universality mentioned before, these
make more difficult to justify the existence of separate schemes. Why should some
government officials, private teachers, and military personnel receive large benefits at the
expense of the rest of the community (as it was shown before) since 1977 the government
was even subsidizing for the last group scheme.
  
                                                                
44 World Bank, Aid-Memorie by the Pension Mission of the World Bank , July 5, 1998.
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5.3.4. Informing the consumer about a “good choice”
Pension is a form of long-term care, so if a new scheme is to be implemented, the
government has to play another important role. This role is to help the individual to select
the most suitable system for his/hers situation. It has to protect the ones that have
disadvantage in choosing properly from the private insurance providers. Therefore, this
can only be effective “ … if they are empowered to make informed decisions about
whether to purchase a product and which product to purchase. …It is important to make
the distinction between allowing for consumer choice and enabling informed consumer
choice. This goals of allowing consumer choice and achieving informed consumer choice
are by no means mutually exclusive.” 45  This should be done accurately because in a
world in which there is an increasing tendency to levy the responsibility of an
individual’s pension on him/herself. Thus, the government should provide a wide variety
of choices that need to be easily understood instead of providing complex choices that
could actually confuse them more and reduce their objectiveness to select wisely.
This information can be communicated not only by the government but also by the civil
society, such as volunteers that can help in the information process. Even though it
sounds difficult, there have been promising attempts like the one that was called The
Gatekeeper Model, a method created by the professors Evelyn Florio and Raymond
Raschko, at Washington State University. This model effectively contributed to spread
the information required by the community.
                                                                
45 Steven Lutzky and Lisa Maria B. Alecxih, Enabling Informed Choice in the Long-Term Care Insurance
Market, Journal of Aging & Social Policy, vol. 10.3 (1999): p. 29.
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The Gatekeeper model is highlighted as a method to insure that older adults at risk of problems that
impact their ability to live independently can be helped by existing systems of care. The model trains
employees of community business and corporations who work with the public to serve as community
gatekeepers by identifying and referring community-dwelling older adults who may be in need of help.
46
This strategic information dissemination model works with the help of people, citizens
that in their daily work already have contact with the population that the model calls “at-
risk,” people such as postal workers, delivery boys, bank tellers, and in general
volunteers. In relation to the Korean case, I believe that this could be shaped through the
Saemaul movement, which encourages to deal with this kind of activities for the next
decade as it is shown in the promoting activities they are sharing with the society.
                                                                
46 Evelyn Florio R. and Raymond Raschko, The Gatekeeper Model: Implications for Social Policy, Journal
of Aging & Social Policy, vol. 10.1 (1998): p. 37.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In addition to all the theoretical background provided, some recommendations need to
have to be pointed out to set the new rules of the game.  In summary, all the benefits
considered so far upon private programs could be the ones that make Korea a good
candidate for new frontiers in social security plans.
Two groups of ideas epitomize my line of thinking. The first ones are based on the
fundamentals of equity, solidarity, unity, and universality. In this attempt some basic
facts should be recalled, first new pensions system are easy to launch when income is
equally distributed among the population.
· As a matter of fact we know that complete equitable growth is not possible to achieve.
Funds that are not transportable will never accomplish the solidarity and efficiency
basic. If there are not constraints to carry individual savings to mutual funds invested
by AFPs, the economy through the market directly and indirectly will foster intra-
generational transfers from high income individuals to low and medium income
compatriots, developing mechanisms not seen before.
· A careful look should be given to the reserve funds. If these are exhausted, the burden
that the government has to sustain will be implicitly translated to the society. The
budget deficits to pay out all the benefits of aging population would crowd out
economic growth; thus, destroying from different angles the idea of sustainable
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growth, something that is hotly debated around the world. The entire society will
suffer the imbalance of the inappropriate decisions taken today. If the transformation
is made, younger generations will see their future more clearly. They will not have to
support the elderly and they will avoid intergenerational transfers because these will
be it “transfers” and not “burdens”. Consequently, the situations seen in the pay-as-
you-go systems, where earlier generations are left better off but latter generations end
up in a worst situation, will be rarely seen.
At length the relevance of these second assortments of conclusions for adopting a private
scheme depends, of course, on some other cultural and institutional factors. Nevertheless,
they acknowledge the strong incentives apply to private plans. They are shaped in a
reflexive form as a way to resonate upon them.
  
· Inexperience or fear? There is not such a thing as inexperience in managing funds;
there is an illusion of the lack of expertise. When a new policy is adopted it is very
hard for a country to understand it from the beginning. It will take time and money to
run an effective system, but people have to prepare themselves to look forward to
learning the new method and applying in their on-job-training.
· The evasion problem and disperse salary components: Hidden earnings are
negligible for the program. The more you pay, the more you get. It’s easy to
understand that if you do not save, you will be left in a bad financial situation in the
future. Then people will not evade, because they will be looking forward to a relaxing
and enjoyable life in their later years. The private system will only take care of the
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people that have subscribed to the program and provide BI or MPB for the rest of
low-income elderly. In the private sector there is no place for evading since the
system rejects this inconvenience immediately. If you delay your contributions or pay
them after the due date, you do not receive what you are supposed to, or simply your
benefits will be suspended until you meet your obligations. Debtors do not qualify for
private schemes. If you are a registrant you want higher replacement ratios and there
is no doubt that everyone knows what is best for him or herself.
In addition to this, people incur evasion when the benefits they are to receive do not
fulfill their expectations, provide low benefit levels and poor quality services.
Government invests poorly and below the standards are the yields that can maintain
the state pension programs. If evasion happens, liquidity will be gone and
administrative costs will raise, the big pitfall of public systems.
· Freedom and symmetry: You choose where and when to invest. Here a selection of a
pension provider is an important as the advantages the individual chooses. The
pension fund administrator will try to attract or retain you by promoting its services
and improving the quality of the benefits. Transparency is likely to be achieved to
gain potential clients and efficiency too; thus, the heard problem of corporate
governance will be neglected. Private firms will have an incentive to provide extra
services such as additional medical services for the elderly, discounts in hospitals, and
other kind of marketing promotions.
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· It is possible to achieve efficiency: For this study efficiency can be defined as lower
costs and better benefits.  The actual level of contribution is 9 percent and if the
government takes the administration of it, the rate has to be increased to at least up to
17.3 percent proposed by the NPRB. Yet, if we allow firms to compete and reach the
current contribution that is lower compared to other countries, we can keep this
percentage and receive high quality services and benefits. Several plans for numerous
categories will be implemented and then, it will depend on the type of plan you sign
up to receive that will determine if you will get higher or lower benefits.  It some
cases the replacement rate can be above the 50 percent considered by the reformist
efforts.  Still, one can think that again redistribution will be gone. If the plan works,
yes, redistribution will not exist anymore. However, here is where transportability
plays an important role. The funds can be centralized and the yield these reserve will
generate a benefit that will help the country as a whole. This communal fund can be
as much as 40 percent of GDP by the year 2020.
This unbelievable figure will even motivate the government to become competitive
and gain liquidity, something required to generate consequent public policies. The
poor investment the government used to make will be no longer held. They will also
like to search for competent managers who will be looking for higher yields and
diversifying their portfolio, obeying the dictates of a sound and transparent prudential
regulation and with the implicit guarantee of the Pension Guarantee Fund.
Then, why shouldn’t Korea engage in this “risky game”? Are people afraid of being
disappointment, or does Korea have a really a weakened economy who is not ready to
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adopt more changes? I consider reorganizations are needed. Of it will be more difficult
for some groups to adapt to these changes, but now is the time to do it. Even if the
economy is recovering form a crisis, and if reforms are not shaped, continuing with the
same system will create a new crisis. If measures are not taken right now, later might be
to late!
Until this point I have dealt mainly with the economic issues, but before I conclude I
would like to reflex upon other aspects related to humanity’s well being. Decision-
makers should not wait for perfect conditions, because perfect status is unachievable in
real world. If it is possible that such perfect conditions are achievable, it will be tardy
with the ones that died on the process of seen how  “Old Age Crisis” was passing through
their lives. All this derives from a problem that will only be realized 20 or 30 years from
now. Should we wait so long and make young generations pay for the whole mess?
Still there is an open door for new prospectus and mechanisms for pension schemes. It is
feasible then, to think in a sui generis mix pension scheme that can be developed later
such as a private and public combined system in which both sectors can compete to
attract subscribers and be benefited themselves, from doing so. Be open minded, let
Korea develop a program that contributes to economic growth, reduction of inequality,
and prosperity of the solidarity principle.
A diligent plan will receive its maximum rewards by a very greatly thankful citizenry
who experienced and who will experience successful stories of welfare improvement. If
the plan works, Korea would have the opportunity to export a reputable “Second Korean
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Economic Miracle,” but this time in the name of social policy and certainly with positive
effects over the rest of the economy.
87
BIBLIOGRAPHY
88
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Chun, Young-Jun, Perso al Income Tax: Personal Pension increase the National
Savings in Korea, Public Finance lectures, Seoul: School of Public Policy and
Global Management, KDI, 27 Sept. 1999.
Chun, Young-Jun, The Inter –and- Intra Cohort Redistributive Effect of the Return of
National Pension System in Korea, Working Paper 98-05, Seoul: Korea Institute
of Public Finance, Sept. 1998.
Comision Interventora del IESS, Memoria Tecnica para la Reforma del Seguro General
Obligatorio, Quito: 1999.
Creedy, John, Pensions and Population Ageing, Northampton: Edward Eldgar Publishing
Limited, 1998.
Creedy, John, and Richard Disney, Social Insurance in Transition, Oxford: David
Stanford, 1985.
De Jong, R., and Theodor Marmor R., Social Policy and Labour Market, Vol. 2,
Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1997.
Diamond, Peter, Privatization of Social Security: Lessons from Chile, Working Paper
5811, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge: November 1993.
Dilnot, Andrew, and Ian Walker, The Economics of Social Security,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
Doherty, Robert E., Industrial and Labor Relations Terms: A Glossary, Ithaca: ILR Press,
1989.
Edwards, Sebastian, The Chilean Pension Reform: A pioneering program,
Working Paper 5811, Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1996.
Feder, Judith, Georgetown University, “Journal of Aging and Social
Policy: Improving Public Financing for Long-Term Care: The
Political Challenge”, Vo .10 #3, New York: The Haworth Press, Inc.,
1999.
Feldstein, Martin, Privatizing Social Security, Chicago: National Bureau
of Economic Research, The Chicago University Press, 1998.
Florio R., Evelyn, and Raymond Raschko, “J urn l of Aging and Social
89
Policy: The Gatekeeper Model: Implications for the Social Policy:
The Political Challenge”, Volume 10 #1, New York: The Haworth
Press, Inc., 1999.
Freeman, Richard, ed. Working Under Different Rules, “Does Larger Social Safety Net
Men Less Economic Flexibility?,” Chap. 5, New York: Russel Sage Foundation,
1993.
Gordon, Margaret S., Social Security Policies in Industrial Countries: A comparative
analysis, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
  
Gustafsson, B, and Anders Klevmarken, The Political Economy of Social Security,
Amsterdam: North Holland, 1989.
Heller, Peter S., Aging in the Asian Tiger Economies, Finance & Development,
Washington: June, 1998.[Online] ProQuest Order 105364995 (08/12/99).
Hyun, Jin-Kwon, Tax reform in Korea: Government proposal an evaluation and the
future, The Korea Herald, 26 Aug.1999, A2.
Korea International Labour Foundation, Korea Labor News (Jan. 1 ~ Jun.30, 1999),
Seoul: KOLIAF, 1999.
Lee, Ju-Ho, and Jong-Il You, “Economic and Social Consequences of
Globalization: The Case of South Korea”: Seoul: KDI School of
International Policy and Management, revised May 1999.
Lutzky, Steven, and Lisa Alecxih, The Lewin Group Fairfax, Virginia,
“Journal of Aging and Social Policy: Enabling Informed Consumer
Choice in the Long-Term Care Insurance Market”, Vol me 10 #3, New
York: The Haworth Press, Inc., 1999.
Mackellar, F. Landis, and William P. McGreevey, The Growth and
Containment of Social Security Systems, Development Policy Review:
Volume 17 #1, Washington: Overseas Development Institute, 1999.
Mallier, A.T., and T.A.C. Shafto, The Economics of Flexible Retirement, London:
Academic Press Limited, 1992.
Mancero, Alfredo, La estrategia del nuevo IESS para eliminar su saldo rojo, Quito:
Semanario LIDERES, 20 may, 1999.
Ministry of Finance and Economy, Djnomics: Korean Economic Development, Seoul:
1999.
90
Moon, Hyung-Pyo, The Korean Pension Scheme, Labor Market and Social Policy
lectures, Seoul: School of Public Policy and Global Management, KDI,  2 Aug.
1999.
Murphy, Joseph, The Privatization of Schooling: Problems and Possibilities, California:
Corwin Press, 1996.
 
National Pension Corporation, National Pension Scheme in Korea, 4th ed., Seoul:
National Pension Corporation of the Republic of Korea, 1997.
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) OECD Jobs Study:
Facts, Analysis, Strategies, Paris: OECD, 1994.
Proceedings of the National Pension Board: Korean Pension Scheme, Seoul: 1998.
Valdez-Prieto, Salvador, The Economics of Pensions, New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1997.
 Wise, David A, Pensions, Labor and Individual Choice, Chicago: National Bureau of
Economic Research, The Chicago University Press, 1985.
Won, Gill-Sang, Anna Song, Woo-Young Kim, and Hai-Young Yun, Editors, Guide to
Writing Thesis/Dissertation, Seoul: School of Public Policy and Global
Management, KDI, 1999.
World Bank, Financing Health Services in Developing Countries, Washington D.C.:
Oxford University Press, World Bank, 1987.
World Bank, The East Asian Miracle, Washington D.C.: Oxford University Press, The
World Bank, 1993.
World Bank, Averting the Old Age Crisis: Policies to Protect the Old and Promote
Growth, Washington D.C.: Oxford University Press, The World Bank, 1994.
World Bank, Aide-Memoire by the Pension Mission of the World Bank, (Mission
conformed by Robert Holzmann, Robert Palacios, Yvonne Sin and Alberto
Musalem), Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1998.
World Bank, Korean old age income security at the crossroads, (Presentation to Korean
Pension Reform Task force by Robert Palacios and Yvonne Sin), Seoul, The
World Bank, Sept.9, 1999.
